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SOME RECENT LITERATURE ON LAW
IN EASTERN AFRICA
William L. Twining -
This symposium grew out of a seminar on problems of East
African Law given at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
the spring of 1971. It is natural that American law teachers and
students should sometimes demand a justification for including in J.D.
curricula courses which focus on law in Africa; it is as natural that
they should not be entirely satisfied with the answer: "Because it is
there." During the past ten years a number of such courses have
nonetheless been offered in American law schools. The remarkable
variety in their style, subject matter, and geographical coverage is as
much a testimony to the adventurous spirit of American academic
lawyers as to a lack of consensus about the educational objectives which
might be achieved by such courses.
Despite this variety, those involved have been confronted, to a
greater or lesser extent, by a few common problems. Some are quite
mundane, such as the difficulty of building up library facilities, dealing
with the variety of motives and interests of students attracted to the
study of such a seemingly esoteric field, and compressing a course
within the limited amount of time that even the most liberal law schools
are normally prepared to allocate to foreign or comparative law. Other
problems are more fundamental. First, those of us who subscribe to
the proposition that for most purposes law is best studied in its
historical, social, and economic context share with other students of
comparative law the problem that "the context" is not on our doorstep
and that much relevant information may not be accessible. Similarly, if
one is concerned with the realities of the law in action, it helps to be
where the action is. Whereas traditional comparative lawyers have
largely restricted themselves to comparing and contrasting legal doc-
trines, many of those writing or teaching about law in various parts of
Africa have attempted to confront the problem directly. Whether they
have always been successful in solving it and whether they have been
making a virtue out of necessity are beside the point. The fact remains
that the nature of the subject virtually compels the student to learn
something of the geographical context, to be sensitive to the relationship
between law and social and economic change, and to ask fundamental
questions about the cultural, ideological, and philosophical assumptions
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underlying his own legal systems and law-ways. A major difficulty in
teaching about African law in an American law school arises because it
cannot be taken for granted that American law students will be familiar
with the relevant "context," with the result that a substantial amount of
time may have to be devoted to preliminary sketching of the background;
the course may deteriorate, as one American law teacher has put it, into
little more than "baby anthropology, baby economics, baby geography,
and baby political science." Because of the necessarily slow takeoff,
American law school courses oriented towards Africa may not be suited
to half-measures: either a substantial amount of time should be allotted
to them or they should not be offered at all. If the latter alternative
were universally chosen, this would be unfortunate, for there are issues
and phenomena in contemporary Africa which are of general interest
and significance.
A second major problem in the past has been the state of the
literature, which is still rather uneven both in quality and coverage.
Only very recently has a substantial body of scholarly legal writing in
the area begun to grow; the improvement of local archives, the develop-
ment of efficient systems of law reporting, and, above all, the emergence
of a significant number of African legal scholars are largely achieve-
ments of the past decade. A primary aim of this symposium is to draw
attention to a number of recent books dealing with law in one region
of Africa, each of which deserves to be judged by the highest standards
of international scholarship. The five works selected for review are not
unique, but they illustrate vividly the wide range of important issues
that are alive in East Africa today: How far can the national legal
systems sustain their "African" character and yet be responsive to the
demands of national unity and economic development? To what extent
is unification of personal law possible and desirable in plural societies?
Do law and lawyers have anything positive to contribute to nation-
building? What is the relationship between law and anthropology?
What can the ideas of theorists as diverse as Hart, Lasswell, Levi,
Llewellyn, Maine, and Weber contribute to our understanding of
African phenomena and vice versa? What are constitutions for and
how can they be encouraged to take root? Are Bills of Rights ever
dysfunctional? And, for those with a taste for the exotic, can songs
ever be validly treated as a "source" of law; if so, in what sense? These
are just a few of the questions raised in the works under review. They
suggest that one good reason for continued American interest, apart
from the general value of any comparative study, is that in Africa today
many fundamental questions about the nature of law and its relation to
society in all its aspects are posed in a peculiarly striking way because
they are, or have in the recent past, been live issues requiring resolution
as a matter of practical necessity.
It is important to remember that the primary audience for literature
on African law should be people in and of Africa; and the main criterion
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for evaluating such works should be the extent to which they cast light
on the nature of African legal systems and thereby contribute directly
or indirectly to the solution of African problems. It is to be counted
as a bonus that the study of law in Africa may also help non-Africans
better to understand their own situation and the nature of legal
phenomena in general. Because this symposium is directed mainly to
an American audience, attention has been focused on the potential
interest of East African legal institutions to people in the United States.
It is hoped that some of the reviewers' remarks will be of wider interest.
Of course, the views expressed are those of the individual contributors.
Each work was selected because it was thought-to be of more than usual
significance, and, if some of the comments are critical, this is only be-
cause it is felt that rigorous, but constructive, criticism may assist the
development of this rapidly progressing field.
READINGS IN AFRICAN LAW. EDITED BY NEVILLE RUBIN &
EUGENE COTRAN. New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1970.
Vol. I: Pp. xxvii, 418. $22.50. Vol. II: Pp. ix, 336. $22.50.
William L. Twining t
In these substantial volumes two legal scholars of the School of
Oriental and African Studies in London have skillfully assembled a wide-
ranging selection of extracts from the scattered literature on customary
law in Africa. They have brought together a wealth of material, much
of which has been relatively inaccessible, and they have largely suc-
ceeded in their stated aim of providing "a comprehensive introduction
to the subject as a whole." 1 The writings of leading anthropologists
such as Bohannan, Fortes, Gluckman, and Schapera are well repre-
sented, as are the works of the pioneers among lawyers such as Allott,
Danquah, and Elias. The editors have been modest in selecting rather
little of their own work for inclusion, but their substantial introduction
contains an excellent discussion of the different perspectives of lawyers
and anthropologists in this area. Their editorial notes are unobtrusive
and useful.
Provided that the reader bears in mind its modest objectives,
Readings in African Law can be safely recommended as a useful intro-
duction to the English language literature on African customary law.
Some important limitations need to be noted, however: first, this is not
an introduction to contemporary law in Africa, but an anthology of
secondary literature on customary law. A majority of the extracts date
f Professor of Jurisprudence, The Queen's University, Belfast; Visiting Professor
of Comparative Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1955, Oxford; J.D. 1958,
University of Chicago; M.A. 1960, Oxford.
1 1 READINGS IN AFRICAN LAW xiii (N. Rubin & E. Cotran eds. 1970).
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from the pre-independence era, and some were published before 1930.
It is notorious that the convention of "the anthropological present" can
give a misleading impression of timelessness. Reading through these
volumes one gets no clear sense of historical perspective. The ambiguity
is compounded for the unwary reader when extracts of widely varying
dates about tribes in different parts of Africa are placed side by side.
Thus, one may ask, can an account of adoption among the Kikuyu
(Kenya) in the late nineteen-fifties be safely compared with accounts
of adoption among the Xhosa (South Africa) in the forties and the
Tswana (Bechuanaland, now Botswana) in the thirties? Given the
state of the literature and the nature of the enterprise, such juxta-
positions are difficult to avoid. But the reader must be on his guard.
A second limitation arises from the choice of "African law" (more
precisely "African customary law") as an organizing concept. For
many purposes this seductive category is at once too narrow and too
wide. It is too narrow because in contemporary Africa it becomes in-
creasingly artificial and misleading to treat customary law as a discrete
phenomenon which persists in some sort of vacuum. While the editors
are well aware of the problem, and few of their authors can be accused
of making crude errors on this count, the general impression left by the
collection is redolent of the literature of classical anthropology, which
tended to treat tribes as isolated units. One result is that there is little
mention of the ideologies and policies of African nationalist leaders, or
of problems of economic development and political integration; nor is
there any systematic discussion of the relationship between customary
law and social change. Even the more familiar topic of the relationship
between customary modes of dispute settlement and Western-style courts
gets scant attention. Furthermore, the category of "African Law" is far
too wide to be any longer satisfactory as a mode of designating a field of
expertise. Like other pretentious and ambiguous labels such as "Com-
parative Law" or "Law and Development," it too often encourages
scholars and students to bite off more than they can chew. In fact
works labeled "African Law" rarely deal with the whole continent. The
present work is almost entirely devoted to anglophonic Africa and
contains little or no material on approximately half the countries in that
large and varied continent. While it was undoubtedly useful at the
pioneering stage for writers like Allott and Elias to outline the general
picture in broad terms, and while there is still value in searching for
uniform patterns, a healthy trend in the direction of regional, sometimes
national, specialization has emerged in recent years. It is difficult
enough for the neophyte to acquire sufficient background to get a feel
for the legal problems of one or two African countries; tempting him to
think of Africa as a single place may lead him into the most elementary
errors.
These limitations make this work unsuitable for use as a course-
book on its own. The one thing that can be said in favor of its price
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is that it makes it rather unlikely that anyone will be tempted to recom-
mend it as a course-book. For other purposes Readings in African Law
will for a long time to come be useful as a rich compendium of general
and illustrative material on customary law.
LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION
IN THE COLONIAL COURTS OF BUSOGA. By LLOYD
A. FALLERS. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Pp. xi, 365. $12.00 hardbound.
Larry I. Palmer t
One might question the value of a well-written, yet relatively
short, scholarly work that proceeds for 100 pages before the author is
able to state explicitly that he is ready to "turn to the main business
of this study . . . . " ' But given the controversial nature of the
literature on African customary legal systems,' a scholar undertakes an
enormous intellectual task if he hopes to make a major contribution to
the field of comparative legal studies. Lloyd Fallers, an anthropologist,
has made such a contribution by using the analyses of several Anglo-
American jurists 3 in his study of the legal reasoning of litigants and
judges of the colonial courts of Busoga.' Fallers' work is an important
contribution for legal scholars interested in interdisciplinary studies.
His book is an example of the type of integration of law and a social
science that we have come to expect in modern scholarship. His use
of legal theories and methodologies in his analysis of the social science
data is both highly sophisticated and critical. In developing his major
thesis that the Soga legal system operates as a system of social control,
"without overt communication about the application of legal concepts-
without precedent or legislation," ' Fallers demonstrates both the ap-
plicability and the inapplicability of analyses from our legal system, with
its strong notion of precedent.6
A lawyer would be naive to rely upon the notion that he has been
trained to "get to the essence" of materials and on that rationale skip
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden. A.B. 1966, Harvard;
LL.B. 1969, Yale.
I L. FALLERS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION IN THE
CoIoNLAL CouRTs or BuSOGA 100 (1969).
2 See March, Sociological Jurisprudence Revisited, A Review (More or Less) of
Max Gluckman, 8 STAN. L. REv. 499 (1956), and Glucknan's reply, id. 767. The
author acquaints the reader with this controversy between the leading writers in the
field early in his work. L. FALLERS, supra note 1, at 9-14.
S E.g., H. L. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION"
To LEaAL REASONING (1948); K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISm IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1962).
4 Busoga is part of what is now Uganda.
5L. FAi.ms, supra note 1, at 312 (emphasis in original).
6 See sources cited note 3 smpra.
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lightly through the first 100 pages. A thorough comprehension of
these three chapters is essential to an understanding of the results of
the cases and Fallers' analysis of them. His discussion of the relation-
ship of the Busoga legal system to the stresses in that society during the
period of colonization is excellent.7 In particular his demonstration that
the function of the colonial courts under British rule is, in many re-
spects, consistent with the Soga's previous system of political authority 8
may help lawyers to understand the relationship of law and legal insti-
tutions to the transformation of societies. Fallers demonstrates that
Soga litigants and judges use legal reasoning in the sense that they
employ "categorizing concepts" ' in determining legal controversies.
Deciding that a certain course of conduct fits within a recognized con-
cept of legal wrong among the Soga is a means of distinguishing legal
standards from merely moral ones."0 Before the common-law trained
lawyer is able to comprehend the application of Soga legal reasoning to
the cases involving marital rights and land rights, he must understand
that law is a "cultural system"-a system of ideas-intimately linked
to the Soga social system."
In an examination of the material 1 on marital and land rights in
the next four chapters, Fallers' application of Soga legal reasoning
results, at times, in a superb synthesis of the "case law" on a particular
subject. The parameters of the concept of "sufficient reason" for
harboring a man's wife, for example, are developed from cases in a
fashion that demonstrates the law's function in Soga society. 3 Al-
though husbands have been occasionally unsuccessful in actions against
their in-laws because there was "sufficient reason" for the wife to be in
her parents' household, Fallers' synthesis of all the cases illustrates that
the legal concept of harboring without reason is used to place the
burden of keeping a marriage together on the wife and her parents.
Despite the stress of new ideas about the role of Soga women-pri-
marily a form of cultural change-legal concepts in the marital area are
relatively stable. In a case where newer ideas about the status of
women are in conflict with traditional notions, judges are likely to be
more explicit in their legal reasoning and their disagreement about the
result, because how a particular judge will apply legal concepts to the
facts of the case depends upon his view of the status of women.' 4 In the
7L. FALLERs, supra note 1, at 1-72.
8 The author draws heavily upon his own work on political authority among the
Soga. L. FALLERS, BANTU BuREAucRAcY: A STUDY OF CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN
THE POLITicAL INSTITUTIONS OF AN EAST AFRIcAN PEOPIE (1965).
9L. FALms, supra note 1, at 20. The term is borrowed from E. LEVI, supra
note 3.
10 Cf. L. FALLims, supra note 1, at 85.
"Id. 14.
1 2 In addition to the case materials selected, the author interviewed judges whom
he had met. Id. 2.
13 Id. 156-68.
14 Id. 323.
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area of land law, Fallers' organization of the cases indicates that Soga
litigants' search for new legal concepts that protect the newer uses of
land, such as leasing, is a reflection of the increasing commercialization
of land."0 Prior to the colonial period, the chief's authority over his
constituents was undifferentiated from his authority to allocate land.
Fallers argues that the Soga legal system needs new concepts to protect
newer land uses because differentiation of political authority and power
to allocate land represents a great social change for the Soga.
The final chapter is a comparative discussion of the distinctive
features of Soga legal reasoning. Compared to the Anglo-American
legal system, the Soga legal system is less explicit in its communication
of legal concepts, but more popular in the sense that legal concepts are
known by a large number of the populace. Not unsurprisingly the Soga
legal machinery is readily accessible to the litigants. Because the Soga
judges and bench enjoy a high degree of respect and authority, which
correlates with the degree of legalism of the court's adjudication, 16 law
performs a different function in Soga society than it performs in
other African legal systems-the Lozi, the Arusha,'8 or the Tiv."9
Fallers concludes with a short discussion of the implications of his work
for the attempts of leaders of independent Uganda to adapt the cus-
tomary legal system to contemporary needs.2" He shows the inappro-
priateness, in light of Soga legal concepts of wrongs in the marital
area,21 of national legislation to be applied in local courts, making
adultery an offense. He suggests that the official government policy
of leaving the customary system alone would perhaps be a more effective
means of adaptation of customary law than codification (the means used
by neighboring Tanzania and Kenya) if the customary courts were
equipped with a reporting system that would tend to encourage more
explicit communication of legal concepts 2
Throughout the book, use of the present tense means the period
1950-1952, when the research was conducted. Fallers, however, makes
the reader fully aware of the relevance of this circumstance in that
there are inherent methodological problems in the use of twenty-year-
old research data. He attempts to overcome as many of these problems
as possible through explicit discussion and the use of appendices, one
15Id. 224.
[OId. 329-31.
17 SeeM. GLUcKmAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (1955).
18 See P. GULLIVE, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AvicA SOCIEv: A STUDY OF THE
ARUSHA: AGRICULTURAL MASAI OF NORTHERN TANGANYIKA (1963).
19 See P. BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE Tiv (1957).
20 The author's statements about post-independence politics in Uganda, L. FALLERS,
supra note 1, at 332-35, are already out of date since Major General Idi Amin led a
successful coup d'etat of the Obote government. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1971, at 1,
col. 7. This is perhaps a demonstration of the inadvisability of such statements since
his comments are relevant regardless of who heads the Uganda Government.
21 L. FALLERS, supra note 1, at 334.
22 Id.
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on Soga kinship and the other on the case records and the methods of
selection. Despite these problems, his work should be carefully studied
by American lawyers. Legal scholars in interdisciplinary areas must
begin, in their use of social science data and techniques, to match the
sophistication demonstrated by Fallers, a social scientist, in his use of
legal materials. Because Fallers' study offers a thesis to explain the
relationship of the change of legal concepts and social transformation,
American lawyers can use his work as a basis for formulating hy-
potheses about the relationship of legal and social change in our own
society.
PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA. By
YAsH P. GHAI & J. PATRICK W. B. McAUSLAN. Nairobi:
Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. xxviii, 536. $16.00.
Stanley A. Koppelman t
Public Law and Political Change in Kenya1 addresses itself to
questions, now being asked in Kenya, that are asked of all young nations.
How successful has Kenya been in solving the many problems it faced
at the time of independence? Is the Kenya Government a stable institu-
tion capable of achieving orderly transfers of power, or is it merely held
together by one charismatic leader and thus in danger of crumbling after
his death? Although the questions are common, the authors' approach
is unique; they develop a theory based on the concepts of constitutional-
ism and legitimacy of governmental institutions that is useful in pur-
suing the answers to these questions.
Public Law does not focus on these questions until near its con-
clusion. Indeed, it may appear to the reader that the authors' novel
approach was merely an afterthought. The book primarily traces the
development of the legal framework of Kenya, in sometimes minute
detail, from its colonial period, through its transition to independence,
and up to the 1969 elections. As an historical study Public Law far
surpasses other works on East Africa both in breadth of coverage and
depth of analysis. The sections on agrarian administration and the
administrative process are especially well done. Though these virtues
are worth presenting, this Review will focus instead on the theory ex-
pounded at the conclusion of the book, because this theory is the book's
most controversial aspect and should most intrigue the student of
African law.
To gauge the likelihood of future political stability in Kenya,
Messrs. Ghai and McAuslan turn to the Weberian concept of legitimacy.
- Article & Book Review Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
I y. GHAi & J. McAusLAx, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA
<1970).
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Thus, of preeminent concern to the authors are the questions whether
the institutions and procedures of government are regarded with trust
and confidence by the people of Kenya, and what role the public law
plays in developing the legitimacy of these institutions and procedures.2
With respect to the first question, the authors state that one task
of new governments is to transfer charismatic legitimacy into institu-
tional legitimacy.3 Charismatic legitimacy is the right to rule derived
from a particular deed, such as engineering the quest for independence,
or from the personality of the leader; the governmental system is ac-
cepted not for what it is, but because it is run by the charismatic leader.
Institutional legitimacy, on the other hand, is based upon the acceptance
of the system itself; the rulers have title to rule because they have
achieved power through the designated system. The latter form of
legitimacy, the authors assert, is the more difficult to create yet much
more necessary to establishment of a lasting constitutional form of
government.4
Ghai and McAuslan believe that the Kenya Government has not
been as successful as it might have been in maintaining the people's
trust and confidence,5 and that this has weakened Kenya's chances of
achieving institutional legitimacy. Specifically, in terms of one institu-
tion of government, the election process, which may play a vital role in
transforming charismatic into institutional legitimacy,0 the authors
accuse the government of speaking as though a multiparty system
existed while initiating constitutional amendments to insure that no
party presents a serious challenge to KANU,7 the country's dominant
party.' With respect to this and other governmental institutions, the
Kenyans' view of the constitution as a ruler's weapon to be used against
political challengers-and therefore to be altered when convenient-pre-
sents a serious challenge to attempts at legitimation.
Nevertheless, there has been some movement towards institutional
legitimacy, and, as Ghai and McAuslan point out, the Kenya Govern-
ment has achieved many of its prerequisites. At the time of inde-
pendence the road to legitimacy had numerous obstacles. Under
colonialism, there was a lack of respect for the process of law. The
Constitution, which was drafted prior to independence, was touted as
an immutable document. Unfortunately, compromises intended to ap-
pease all minority groups, and an underlying distrust of power by these
groups, resulted in establishment of a weak form of government-one
not conducive to achieving a sense of nationhood and rapid economic
development. Even if the Government was carried away in its removal
of constraints on the executive, these actions must be placed in the
21d. 505.
3 Id. 519.
4 Id.
5 Id. 506.
6Id. 519.
7 Kenya African National Union.
8 Y. GHAI & J. McAusLAN, supra note 1, at 512-13.
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context of events, a context suggesting that some change was inevitable.
Thus, while the Government may have sometimes lost sight of the need
to preserve public confidence, it may not have been acting in bad faith
as Ghai and McAuslan would have us believe.
With respect to the second question, the role of public law in
developing the legitimacy of the institutions and procedures of govern-
ment, the authors conclude that the "credibility gap" existing in Kenya
severely diminishes the country's chances of achieving institutional
legitimacy. Although the disparity between the rhetoric of the Kenya
Government and its practices is one factor bearing on institutional
legitimacy, there are other equally important factors. The orderly
transference of power and the need for assuring that the President will
not arbitrarily exercise his power are extremely important con-
siderations.
Ghai and McAuslan have contributed a valuable, thought-provoking
analysis. If the Kenya Government has been acting in bad faith, the
authors' pessimism concerning institutional legitimacy is justified. But
the facts as presented in the book suggest that the Government has been
merely careless. If so, a more extensive explanation of other factors is
necessary before one may hazard a guess about the future of constitu-
tionalism in Kenya.
REPORT OF THE KENYA COMMISSION ON THE LAW
OF SUCCESSION. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1968. Pp.
iii, 167. lOs ($1.50).
James D. Keeney t
In 1967, the President of the Republic of Kenya appointed a
commission on the Law of Succession, and another on the Law of
Marriage and Divorce. Each commission was directed "to make recom-
mendations for a new law providing a comprehensive and, so far as may
be practicable, uniform code . . . applicable to all persons in Kenya
... *,, I The issues facing these commissions should interest
Americans since they reveal basic tensions similar to those inherent in
our own multicultural and dynamic federal system.
Kenya is a nation with extraordinary cultural and legal diversity.
In addition to numerous African tribes of several distinct racial and
linguistic families, the country's population includes large numbers of
Europeans, Asians, and Arabs.2 During the British colonial period, one
f Student, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LAW OF SuccEssIoN (1968) (un-
paginated Letter of Transmittal) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].2 The 1962 census enumerated about 34,000 Arabs, 56,000 Europeans, and 176,000
Asiatics, in addition to scores of Bantu, Hamitic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Nilotic African
tribes. The total population was about 8.6 million. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS
DEMOGRAPHIC YEARnO 1963, at 304-05, U.N. Doc. ST/STAT (1964).
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code of succession was made applicable to Europeans and another to
Asians.' The African majority was left free to make wills and inherit
property according to the "customary law" of the various tribes.' If,
however, an African or an Asian happened to be a Muslim, his estate
might instead be divided in a Muslim court, according to rules of in-
heritance inscribed in the Quran.5
In recognition of this diversity, the Government's directive to the
Commission on the Law of Succession was very carefully balanced.
The Commission was to produce a "comprehensive . . . code . . .
applicable to all persons in Kenya," but the code was to be uniform only
"so far as may be practical." 6 Thus the Commission was given the
task of deciding the extent to which a true unification of this area of
personal law should be attempted.
The Commission seems to have interpreted its mandate so as to
preclude consideration of an irreverent but critical threshold question:
why is a uniform inheritance law needed or even desirable in such a
diverse society? Is it not likely that an attempt to legislate change in
this area will create animosity rather than unity? The Report alleges
the opposite conclusion' but does not articulate the Commission's
reasoning. We are given little more than a bare recommendation that
a uniform law of testamentary disposition and intestacy should be ap-
plied throughout most areas of the country.8 Of course, it is possible
to speculate about why uniform inheritance law might be desirable-
administrative convenience, problems faced by urban "detribalized"
Africans, to name only two-but the Commission's silence gives the
reader no assistance.
The main body of the Report is directed at a second issue. Assum-
ing the proposed comprehensive code is to be uniform despite the
nation's diversity, what provisions should the code contain? Ignoring,
perhaps wisely, the possibility of introducing a wholly foreign law or
simply extending the law of one community to cover the entire popula-
tion, the Commission assumed that the new code should synthesize
existing rules applied by the various communities.
The Commission's method was to examine each community's
existing law in an abstract fashion in order to determine which of its
3 The Indian Succession Act of 1865 applied to the entire non-African population
of Kenya, except Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists, while the Probate and Adminis-
tration Act of 1881 applied to the Asian population (mainly persons from India).
REPORT, supra note 1, at [ 30.
4 In 1961 some of the provisions on wills contained in the Indian Succession Act
of 1865 were made applicable to Africans. Id. 31.
5The Islamic law of succession applied to the estates of certain Muslims by
virtue of § 4 of the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Act. Jurisdic-
tion to administer Islamic law of succession is vested concurrently in the High Court
and the Kadhi's courts. Id. 35.
6Id. (unpaginated Letter of Transmittal).
7'"jU] niform law is part of nation building." Id. ff 61.
e Report recommended that the uniform law of intestacy should not apply to
agricultural land and crops thereon, or to livestock situated in certain administratively
determined areas. Id. [ 74 (Recommendation No. 1).
[Vol.l19
BOOK REVIEWS
rules ' were "defective." Whatever one thinks of this method,10 the
Commission's application of it, though thorough and competent, is open
to criticism. Remarkably, the Commission found nothing defective
about the laws currently being applied to Europeans and Asians, except
uncertainty and failure to reflect changes recently adopted in England
and India." It found, however, five basic defects in the content of
African customary laws: (1) the testator may not apportion shares of
his estate with complete freedom; (2) the rights of women to share in
inheritance are very limited; (3) division of property in polygamous
families is normally made without regard for the number of children
each wife has; (4) customary laws were designed for property such as
land and cattle and are inadequate for modern forms of property such
as insurance policies; and (5) the deceased's son or brother usually
acts as trustee for the family.?
Once it adopted the goal of uniformity, the Commission faced a
series of issues about which there was fundamental disagreement. To
allow free testamentary disposition, for example, would contradict basic
philosophical and religious beliefs of the Muslims,13 while not to allow
it would run counter to basic traditions of the European community. 4
To grant women rights of inheritance would upset traditionalists, 15
while a law which did not protect wives and daughters would be un-
acceptable to more progressive elements of the population.'" Yet,
despite its multiracial composition and its obvious attempt to maintain
objectivity, the Commission wound up characterizing the African view-
point on many of these issues as "defects" in African law.
The Commission seems to have made only two important conces-
sions to the legal traditions of the African majority tribes as it under-
stood them. It decided to allow oral wills (but only if made within
three months of death) '1 and in cases of intestacy to follow the African
custom of holding estates in trust rather than distributing them (but
with the widow rather than her son or brother as the trustee) . In
9 For its knowledge of the rules applied by the African tribes of Kenya, the
Commission relied wholly upon the work of the Restatement Project contained in,
2 E. COTRAa, RESTATEMENT OF AFRicAN LAw: KENYA II: THE LAw OF SUccEssloN
(1969). Eugene Cotran, who directed the Kenya Restatement Project, was also a
member of, and secretary to, both commissions discussed here.
lo It is somewhat disturbing that the Report does not appear to recognize that
rules are only part of the total scheme by which conduct is regulated in human society
-and indeed, that formal rules often bear little relation to what actually happens.
See Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Job of Juristic
Method, 49 YA.E L.J. 1355 (1940); Twining, Two Works of Karl Llewellyn, 31
MfOD. L. REv. 165, 174-80 (1968) (discussing Llewellyn's "Law-Jobs" theory).
11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 40-45.
12d. 11 53-57.
13 See note 28 infra.
14 See REPORT, supra note 1, at f1 43.
15 Note 27 infra.
16 See REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 135.
17 Id. 1 88 (Recommendation No. 8).
1SM.8 1 133, 135 (Recommendations Nos. 31, 32).
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most respects the Commission seems to have been guided by its own,
and perhaps the Kenya Government's, progressive concern for the plight
of women and children, and by its familiarity with common law ad-
versary legal traditions. Thus the provisions for written wills, 9
probate in adversary courts,2 ° and rather specific and inflexible rules to
govern cases of intestacy " generally have a familiar common law flavor.
Whether one agrees with its methods and conclusions or not, the
Report is an important document. The discussion it has so far en-
gendered both in East Africa and abroad provides a valuable con-
tribution to the literature on law reform.' The most interesting com-
mentary on the Report to date has been provided by the Kenya National
Assembly, which received the Commission's draft bill in November,
1970. To the surprise of those observers who expected the one-party
legislature to rubber-stamp it, the bill provoked lengthy debate and was
ultimately tabled for six months, a procedure which may have killed it.
The debates ' make fascinating reading. The main conclusion
which emerges from these colorful and sometimes emotional arguments
is that the members of the Assembly saw little need for a uniform law
of succession and feared that the enactment of the Commission's draft
bill would produce chaos because it was wholly out of step with African
tribal traditions. Muslim speakers urged that the proposed uniform
code would be contrary to their religion. 4  Others claimed that the
bill was designed to favor foreigners and those Africans who had re-
cently amassed sizable fortunes and now wanted to disinherit their own
tribesmen. 5 The bill was decried as too foreign,2" and its provisions
for increasing the rights of women and illegitimate children were at-
tacked as contrary to African traditions 17 and to Islamic law.28
91Id. 11 105, 107, 109-12, 114 (Recommendations Nos. 20-26).
20 Id. 4I4I 115, 117, 118, 120, 162-214 (Recommendations Nos. 27-30, 48-81).
211d. 111 133-58 (Recommendations Nos. 31-47).
2See generally Anderson, Comments With Reference to the Muslim Community,
5 E. AFRICAN L.J. 5 (1969); Derrett, Comments With Reference to Hindu Law,
5 E. AFRICAN LJ. 21 (1969); Kahn-Freund, Law Reform in Kenya, 5 E. AFRICAN
L.J. 54 (1969); Ollennu, Comments With Special Reference to Cu stomary Law,
5 E. AFRICAN L.J. 97 (1969); Schiller, The Draft Legislation and Customary Law,
5 E. AFRICAN L.J. 88 (1969); The Report of the Kenya Commission on the Law of
Succession: A Comment, 2 E. AFRICAN L. REv. 221 (1969); Derrett, Book Review,
14 J. AFRICAN L. 65 (1970).
2 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF KENYA, DEBATES ON THE LAW OF SUCCESSION BIL
1931-65, 2001-45, 2078-98 (Nov. 17-19, 1970) (2d reading).
24Id. 2039 (remarks of Mr. Araru).
25 Id. 2016 (remarks of Mr. Magugu) ; id. 2021 (remarks of Mr. Ayah) ; id. 2082
(remarks of Mr. Mutiso).
26Id. 1955-56 (remarks of Mr. Mwithaga) ; id. 2018 (remarks of Mr. Ayah);
id. 2040 (remarks of Mr. Araru); id. 2082 (remarks of Mr. Ahmed); id. 2091
(remarks of Mr. Mwangole).
27Id. 2022 (remarks of Mr. Ayah); id. 2037 (remarks of Mr. Mvwamzandi);
id. 2016 (remarks of Mr. Magugu) ; id. 2009-10 (remarks of Mr. Munyasia) ; id.
1955-56 (remarks of Mr. Mwithaga).
281d. 2039-40 (remarks of Mr. Araru).
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The Assembly's rejection of the Commission's work may mean
that Kenya is to have separate laws of succession for some time to come,
but the question will probably resurface eventually. One hopes that
during the interim more study will be made of African law-ways (as
opposed to mere rules of law) so that the next commission will be in
a better position both to define the problems caused by separate systems
of law and to propose workable solutions. The next commission would
in any event probably be well advised to seek more modest reform,
thereby embroiling itself in fewer basic value disagreements.
REPORT OF THE KENYA COMMISSION ON THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. Nairobi: Government
Printer, 1968. Pp. 209.
Marguerite Johnston t
The problems arising from the establishment of uniform personal
law are manifest nowhere more clearly than in attempts to formulate
marriage and divorce laws. Legislating in this area of fundamental
human concern ought to be approached sensitively, not only because of
the impact on every individual citizen, but also because of the ramifica-
tions of any action for the institutional legitimacy so important to a
newly independent nation such as the Republic of Kenya.'
The Commission was appointed to make recommendations for a
uniform law of marriage and divorce applicable to all persons in Kenya.
The new law was to replace existing customary law, Islamic law, Hindu
law, and relevant acts of Parliament.' The Commission was "to pay
particular attention to the proper status of women in relation to mar-
riage and divorce in a free democratic society." ' In formulating its
methods and general approach, the Commission endeavored to reconcile
two obviously competing interests: (1) that any uniform law must be
founded on the African way of life, and (2) that traditional rites and
customs should not be codified because to do so would impede the rapid
change that is occurring in the African way of life.4 Paramount con-
j-B.A. 1967, M.A. 1970, University of Pennsylvania. Graduate Student, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Department of Anthropology.
3 For a discussion of institutional legitimacy in another, context, see the preceding
review of Public Law and Political Change in Kenya in this series.
2
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LANw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE (1968)
(introductory page signed by the commissioners) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. For
an indication of the current lack of uniformity in the law of marriage and divorce,
see id. 11142, 43.
3 Id. (introductory page signed by the commissioners). For examples of mani-
festations of the current inferior status of women, see id. 111 54, 55. In seeking to
draft a uniform law, the Commission was not attempting to collate systems of tribal
law, a task which had been previously undertaken in E. COTRAN, THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE: RESTATEMENT OF AFRIcAN LAW, KENYA (1968).
41d. ff 9.
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siderations in constructing the recommendations, according to the
Commission, were the objectives of promoting marriage stability and
discouraging divorce.5 This Review will evaluate the Commission's
Report by examining the apparent conception of African customary
marriage inherent in the recommendations, and by judging the con-
sonance of these proposals with the stated objectives and approach of
the Commission.
It is significant that the "unsatisfactory features of the [customary]
law," selected by the Commission for revision, have appeared elsewhere
as the "distinguishing features of customary marriage": ' prevalent
polygamy; difficulty in determining which ceremonies establish the
legality of the marriage; the supposed function of brideprice as estab-
lishing validity; the woman's lesser legal status than her husband's; easy,
extra-judicial divorce; and marriage contracted between families rather
than individuals.7 Against this background the Commission premised
its approach on the principle that customary marriage laws must be
changed; 8 however, the distinguishing features actually are drawn not
from one type, but from many types, of marriage in Africa. The
criterion for selection appears to have been the degree of divergence
from an ideal form of marriage in Western culture. This systematic
elimination of "undesirable" features-with the reluctant exception of
polygamy-from the particular legal marriage proposed in the Report,
serves as one indicator of the Commission's rather ethnocentric con-
ception and treatment of African marriage.
The concept of the "potentially polygamous marriage" will now
mean that a marriage can, regardless of form, be declared monogamous
from its inception. When marriage takes place, the parties explicitly
declare the nature of the marriage.' Fixing the nature of a marriage by
an agreement appears an attempt to increase a woman's rights by ensur-
ing that she will never be an unwilling party to a polygamous marriage.
But the ramifications of this attempt, when combined with those of con-
nected recommendations, are problematical. Marriage is declared to
be binding for life,1" and can only be modified "by a joint declaration
of husband and wife freely made in the presence of a registrar and
5Id. 112.
6 Id. 47-58 (unsatisfactory); Cotran, The Changing Nature of African Mar-
riage, in FAMILY LAW ix AsIA AND AmcA 16 (1967) (distinguishing). The Com-
mission defines marriage as "the voluntary union of a man and a woman, intended to
last for their joint lives." Id. 159; see Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
For a discussion of the influence of Hyde on marriage and divorce legislation in other
parts of Africa, see Zabel, Hyde v. Hyde-A Comparative Study of the Law of
Marriage in the Sudan and Nigeria, 14 UTAii L. REv. 22 (1969). Mr. Cotran, a mem-
ber of the Commission, has noted elsewhere that this definition diverges from the
concept of marriage under African customary law. Cotran, supra, 15.
7 See REPoRT, supra note 2, at [ 47-58.
8 Under current law, the legal consequences of marriage differ under the different
bodies of law, even beyond the permissibility of polygamy. One of the purposes of
the Report is to eliminate these disparities. Id. f1147-58.
9 Id. 1182.
lOId. 182 (Recommendation No. 11).
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recorded in writing at the time of making." " The Report does provide
for divorce, but none would be permitted until three years after mar-
riage.' In addition, it is suggested that a petition for divorce should
not be permitted unless the dispute has first been referred to a con-
ciliatory body, and that body has failed to settle the dispute. 3 The
only legitimate ground for divorce would be "that the marriage has
irreparably broken down." 14
While the program underlying these provisions appears to com-
prise both a basic policy determination to discourage divorce and an
attempt to elevate the status of women, it suffers from undue emphasis
on one set of cultural values. Polygamy is quite prevalent in Kenya,
and, formerly, most societies were polygamous.' 5 One gets the im-
pression from reading the Report that the authors generally disapproved
of polygamy (although polygamy does not in itself indicate low female
status), but declined to recommend abolition because of the substantial
weight of public opinion in favor of retaining it."8 Indeed, the Report
states, "We think polygamy will die out and that it is in the national
interest that it should. . . . We believe that the law should do every-
thing reasonably possible to discourage the practice of polygamy." '1
The proposals in their entirety reflect Western inclinations and can
hardly be said to be founded on the African way of life.
It is not unlikely that at the time of marriage two people may wish
to contract a binding monogamous marriage; however, it is known that
additional unions, even when legally invalid from the point of view of
the state, may still frequently occur. The difficult impediments to escap-
ing a monogamous marriage, which, of course, reinforce the stated
policy of discouraging polygamy, have been outlined, and should be
scrutinized in predicting the systemic effect of the proposals in their
entirety. Although the Commission has given some consideration to
African tradition in formulating these proposals, greater margin for
gradual change might have been provided by facilitating divorce or
change in the nature of a marriage. One proposal, instituting govern-
mental conciliation agencies, does appear oriented toward this goal.
To regularize marriages, the Commission proposes uniform re-
quirements for valid unions. The proposed law leans toward presuming
validity despite irregularities in formalities.'" For example, the bride-
"1 Id. 85 (Recommendation No. 12).
12Id. 11286 (Recommendation No. 112). In addition, divorces after three years
of marriage are to be granted according to the discretion of the court. See id. 1[ 293.
13Id. f 288 (Recommendation No. 113(a)).
14Id. 11298 (Recommendation No. 114). Factors to be considered in determining
whether there has been a breakdown are discussed in 11299-312.
'5Id. 173.
1GId. 173-81.
'7 Id. 11178, 81.
Is But certain irregularities-for example, failure to meet the age requirement-
would nullify the marriage. Id. ff 65 (Recommendation No. 4).
1971]
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price would be eliminated as a prerequisite to a valid marriage.'" The
Report notes that brideprice is not a purchase price; it indicates the
prospective groom's ability to care for the bride, and-through a series
of payments-provides an opportunity to build viable social relations
with in-laws and ultimate affinal solidarity2 ° For the state, the diffi-
culty in determining the legality of nuptial ceremonies has always been
a troublesome feature of customary marriage; but the great variation in
brideprice rights from society to society had rendered use of the bride-
price unsatisfactory to indicate marriage validity. The Commission's
uniform criteria for legal marriages are somewhat more consistent with
the Western concept of marriage validity than with the former de-
pendence on brideprice payments.
Perhaps the most serious fault of the Report is the Commission's
conception of social change and urbanization, which seems to underlie
the neglect of indigenous African law in the proposed law." The
Commission seems to believe the preferences of the population in the
area of personal laws are evolving in the direction of the proposals, be-
cause of intertribal mixing in the cities and consequent loosening of
indigenous legal systems and individuals' obligations to rural kin.
Anthropologists, however, have found that the dichotomy between
urban and rural dwellers has been drawn too sharply. For example, in
the Kenya coastal city of Mombasa, the majority of Africans are said
to maintain family and lineage ties in rural areas; intertribal marriages
are exceptions to marriages within the tribal category. 2 In fact, the
retention of indigenous customs in personal, domestic spheres, as op-
posed to the economic or political spheres, has caused some anthro-
pologists to separate analytically these domains in studies of cultural
change; becoming a wage-earner or politician is no guarantee of parallel
changes in an individual's views on marriage, or his relations with his
family."
David Parkin, an anthropologist, has found that a society's tradi-
tional social and political organization, rather than mere presence in a
city, affects the adaptations marriages make to the urban setting.2"
Members of a major Kenya society, the Luo, are frequent migrants to
the city of Kampala, Uganda, and many remain there permanently.
Although the Luo reside in tribally mixed housing developments, even
those who are economically and politically quite successful have a
negligible rate of tribal intermarriage. Parkin ascribes this situation,
1DId. 11115 (Recommendation No. 24).
201d. 111 107-15.
21 Id. 119, 52.
22 Wilson, Mombasa-A Modern Colonial Municipality, in SocIAL CHANGE IN
MoDE AFRIcA 98 (A. Southall ed. 1961).
23 For a discussion of "situational change," as well as other approaches to cultural
change, see Mitchell, Theoretical Orientations in African Urban Studies, in THE
SocIAl. ANTHROPOLOGY OF CoMINPLEx SocriEs 37 (M. Banton ed. 1966).
24 Parkin, Types of Urban African Marriage in Kampala, 36 AFRIcA 269 (1966).
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in part, to the strong agnatic Luo descent groups, which corporately
own land and retain an interest in their female members, for whom
high, recoverable brideprice is paid. Urban tribal associations and
agnatic clansmen residing in the city maintain surveillance over their
members there and continue to regulate their marriages. It seems, then,
that societal diversity would make it difficult not only to draft and
implement a uniform law, but also to predict a single direction for
social change.
Kenya is a structurally plural society politically dominated by a
cultural minority.25 In their colonial government of Kenya, the
British recognized pluralism in family law as a practical necessity. To
the newly independent state seeking to consolidate its power and unite
its peoples, measures which tend to restrict pluralism, such as the
Commission's proposed law, are understandably attractive. The goal
of a uniform law in this area, however, should have been approached
with greater deference to the diversity and tenacity of indigenous law
and customs in domestic relations.
25 Kuper, Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems, in PLURALISm IN AFICA
7 (L. Kuper & M. Smith eds. 1969).
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DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR
CITIZEN ACTION. By JOSEPH L. SAX. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1971. Pp. xix, 252. $6.95.
Edward Lee Rogers 1
John F. Hellegers t
Recently renewed and expanded public awareness of the environ-
mental crisis has spawned a goodly number of popular environmental
books. Most of them reflect a pervasive gloom about the prospects for
preserving the quality of our rapidly deteriorating environment for
ourselves and our progeny.- Professor Sax's book, written for both
the general public and the lawyer, is at once pragmatic and theoretical.
Without much pause for gloomy environmental prognoses, Professor
Sax devotes his book to explaining how citizens can become effective
guardians of the environment by bringing lawsuits on behalf of the
public's interest in environmental resources.2
The author, a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, is
an eminent authority on environmental law.' The book reflects a
painstaking and perceptive consideration of fundamental flaws in our
governmental system that have contributed heavily to our inability to
cope with environmental problems. Professor Sax offers no complete
remedy for such flaws but persuasively argues that properly prosecuted
citizen lawsuits are necessary, if we are to alleviate the effects of those
flaws.
Paradoxically, despite the proliferation of statutes and agencies
charged with protecting our environmental resources, the environment
t General Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund. B.S. 1954, LL.B. 1956, Univer-
sity of Oregon; L.L.M. 1959, New York University. Member, Oregon and District
of Columbia Bars.
-Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund. A.B. 1962, Princeton University;
LL.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania. Member, New York Bar.
I See, e.g., B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL (1963); P. ERLIcH, THE
PoPuLATIoN BOMB (1968); R. FALK, THis ENDANGERED PLANET (1971); W. MARx,
THE FRAIL OcEAN (1967); cf. L. MUMFORD, THE PENTAGON OF POWER (1970);
R. & L. RIENOW, MOMENT IN THE SUN (1967).
2 Many cases have upheld the standing of citizens' groups to maintain suits chal-
lenging administrative decisions affecting the public interest in environmental resources
and in other areas of public concern. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). But cf. Sierra
Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub norn. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
3 He is also the author of Michigan's Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MIcH. Coiip. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-07
(Supp. 1971), which gives citizens the right to maintain suits "to obtain declaratory
and equitable relief against [private and public entities] for the protection of the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impair-
ment or destruction." Id. § 691.1202(1). Similar bills (e.g., S. 1082, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971)) are pending at the federal level.
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has continued to deteriorate.4 Although we have hardly begun cleaning
up our air and waterways, the industrialization and power generation
that will be needed to sustain present rates of economic and population
growth promise to impose even greater burdens on those resources.
Hopes for amelioration lie with a relatively slender but growing pol-
lution abatement technology, with more intelligent allocation of re-
sources,5 and with a stabilization of the population. Environmental
problems are, of course, far broader than pollution problems. Many
projects-such as dams, barge canals, land fills, highways, and the
channelization of free-flowing streams-obliterate rivers, marshes, wet-
lands, and other increasingly rare and valuable resources. In many
instances, objective analysis would show that the damage of such
projects outweighs their alleged social or economic benefits or, at least,
that sound environmental planning would disclose feasible, less damag-
ing alternatives.
As Professor Sax's book demonstrates with interesting and de-
tailed case examples, the public agencies responsible for promoting or
permitting such projects repeatedly fail to make responsible environ-
mental decisions. While the author agrees that administrative agencies
should have an important part in regulating and monitoring activities
that have environmental impact, he argues that placing sole reliance
on bureaucrats or elected officials to protect the public's interest in
environmental resources is a grave mistake. He objects strenuously to
the notion that has prevailed until relatively recently that the bureaucrat,
because of his expertise, should be the final arbiter of the "destiny of
our air, water, and land resources." '
His case analyses demonstrate that the necessity of accommodating
many interests often prevents administrative agencies from making or
adhering to decisions based upon their supposed expertise. The most
obvious reason is political pressure. When there is a truly important
environmental issue in a proposed action, with high political and
economic stakes in the outcome of the administrative decision, the
administrator will come under pressure from a number of sources.
Above all, he will feel constrained to protect his agency. An excellent
example was the behavior of the Department of Interior in considering
a proposal to fill in a portion of the Potomac River at the mouth of
Hunting Creek, within sight of the Nation's Capitol. Attempting to
respond to conflicting outside pressures, the Department vacillated in its
decision regarding the fill permit, which would allow the destruction of
a wildlife and waterfowl habitat for the construction of luxury apart-
4 See, e.g., NADER TASK FORCE REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION: WATER WASTE-
LAND (D. Zwick ed. 1971).
G Query, for example, whether an economy that depends upon planned obsolescence
and artificial creation of demand to maintain prosperity is consistent with long-range
environmental imperatives. See, e.g., V. PAcKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS (1960);
cf. Treires, Kicking the Defense Habit, 210 NATION 200 (1970).
o J. SA X, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT xvii (1971).
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ments. The initial decision not to oppose the permit was, in Professor
Sax's description:
a classic case of "sub-optimizing"-that is, a case in which a
decision was made that seemed best to those who had power
to decide when all the many constraints, pressures, and in-
fluences at work were taken into account. From the inside
perspective of a government agency, hard choices must be
made. An agency has its own priorities and legislative pro-
gram; it has conflicting constituencies among which it must
mediate, and in whose eyes it must-for its own good-appear
to have a balanced position; it has a budget to consider and
thereby a need for friends in the legislature.7
Professor Sax also believes that excessive reliance for environ-
mental protection upon public administrators, acting under vague and
broadly discretionary standards, has contributed to the failure of our
system to recognize and develop an adequate legal theory of public
rights in environmental resources. That no member of the public,
as such, has been considered to have a legal claim to clean air, water,
and other fundamental environmental resources equivalent to those he
could make for private property interests has undoubtedly contributed
to the notion that such resources are free for the taking.
The author discusses various administrative arrangements that
might make the development of a privately enforceable public right
unnecessary, and finds them wanting. Public hearings held prior to
the taking of administrative action are helpful in informing the citizen
of what may occur, but they give him little leverage. A citizen par-
ticipates in such hearings not as a party with protected rights, but as
an interested person whose only right is to be heard. Often the net
effect of such ineffective "participation" is simply citizen disillusion-
ment, as members of the public discover that insiders view these hear-
ings mainly as devices for citizen catharsis. Advisory and planning
councils may have valid roles to play in policymaking, but they cannot
begin to investigate and monitor every situation threatening the en-
vironment. Each case must be decided on its own merits. In Professor
Sax's view there is no way to assure that such decisions will be made
fairly and objectively unless the public has full access to the courts
where those determinations can be reviewed by non-insiders, that is,
judges.
The concept of judges as non-insiders is at the heart of Professor
Sax's analysis. While they may be no wiser than administrators and
in many instances have substantially less technical expertise, federal or
other judges with secure tenure do stand somewhat apart from the
agency system and the political process. Thus they are not subject to
7 Id. 53.
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the kinds of political pressures that plague even the most competent and
honest administrators and politicians.
Professor Sax points out that not only are tenured judges rela-
tively independent after appointment; they are also unlikely to be
appointed on the basis of a particular attitude toward environmental
issues, since these issues are likely to occur in only a small portion of a
judge's anticipated case load. At present this is probably true; but as
environmental issues become more pressing, as they enter into a larger
proportion of cases, and as powerful economic interests experience the
impact of adverse judicial decisions, great pressures will accumulate for
the appointment of "safe" judges. The recent history of the involve-
ment of courts in race relations and civil rights furnishes an instructive
parallel.'
In addition to stressing the independence of the judiciary, Pro-
fessor Sax notes that while agency decisions or plans may be deferred
indefinitely, the filing of a complaint and the rules of practice impose
deadlines for action, enabling the citizen to take the initiative in having
the dispute resolved. Another advantage the author sees in litigation
is that it requires issues to be refined and narrowed for decisionmaking.
Thus, asserted environmental protection guarantees in any particular
project will be analyzed and measured against the case presented by
the opposing party. Finally, the author points out that judges have
relevant fields of expertise of their own. In addition to their fact-
8 The controversy surrounding the attempt of the Nixon administration to alter
the complexion of the Supreme Court provides an illustration of this process. See
Hearings on the Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; Hearings on the Nomination of George Harrold Cars-
well, of Florida, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Although earlier controversies
may not have surfaced to the same extent as those over recent nominations, judicial
appointments on the basis of individual attitudes toward important or emerging social
issues are by no means a recent development. See, e.g., D. DANELSKI, A SuPREmIE
CoURT JusTIcE Is APPOINTED (1964) (treating the nomination of Pierce Butler to the
Court in 1922).
Pressures of this sort, although not specifically directed toward judicial appoint-
ments, have already been felt in the environmental area. In the fall of 1970, the
Internal Revenue Service, in what some observers saw as a politically motivated
appeal to business interests, temporarily suspended the tax-deductible status of con-
tributions to groups formed to litigate in the public interest. Had this suspension
become permanent, environmental litigation against well-financed defendants would
have become exceedingly difficult. As to the long-run receptivity of the courts to
such litigation, see N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (Excerpts From Inter-
view With Chief Justice Warren Burger on Role of Supreme Court). Chief Justice
Burger expressed the opinion that:
Young people who decide to go into the law primarily on the theory that
they can change the world by litigation in the courts . . . may be in for some
disappointments. . . . [T]hat is not the route by which basic changes . . .
should be made. That is a legislative and policy process, part of the political
process. And there is a very limited role for courts in this respect.Id.
Justice Burger was not addressing himself specifically to the environmental area,
and there is some reason for reading his remarks narrowly, since he is also the author
of one of the decisions that goes furthest in according standing to citizen groups in
public interest litigation. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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finding abilities, judges are skilled in perceiving the areas of actual
dispute underlying the issues framed by the parties. In the author's
view, a judge's lack of technical expertise in environmental areas will
not preclude him from determining whether the party with the burden
of persuasion has adequately carried it any more than it would in other
areas of complex litigation.
Unfortunately, however, as the author recognizes, courts are often
asked to decide environmental cases on grounds that bear little or no
relation to their merits, because of the restrictive rules governing judicial
review of administrative actions. For example, the Hudson Express-
way decision,' which preserved a river gorge by enjoining the con-
struction of a freeway, was premised on a finding that the causeway to
be constructed in the river was a "dike" within the meaning of a long-
forgotten provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,0 con-
struction of which required explicit congressional approval. Since
approval had not been obtained, the citizen-plaintiffs were able to obtain
an injunction. Professor Sax would prefer a system in which our
courts decided the issues before them on their merits, rather than on
such niceties. He believes that the rules of review-the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard and the substantial-evidence rule "-have led some
courts to give undue deference to the decisions of administrators. After
describing several cases in which highway location decisions were
challenged, he states: "[T]hose opinions treat as a fact to be believed
rather than an assertion to be tested the statement of a highway depart-
ment that it has amply considered all relevant alternatives." 2 Where
the courts have thus refused to determine whether such alternatives
have been adequately considered there may have been "a judicial failure
to recognize the citizens' right, enforceable by law, to environmentally
sound planning. It is this right that is the essence of a true law of the
environment .... 1 "
Several recent environmental cases " give reason to hope that,
within the existing limits of judicial review, courts are beginning to
scrutinize agency decisions more thoroughly and will require articula-
tion of the bases for agency decisions and justification of the rejection
of alternative proposals. Such a trend could go far in achieving recog-
nition of the citizens' right to sound environmental planning.
9 Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), aff'g 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
3033 U.S.C. §401 (1964).
"See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964).
12 J. SAx, supra note 6, at 146.
13 Id. 147.
14 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) ; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594, 596-98
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 941 (1966) ; cf. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428
(1967).
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Professor Sax recognizes that there may be ongoing administrative
practices and programs that deserve to be challenged by litigation. As
an example he cites Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers,15 in which the plaintiffs successfully sought an injunction
against the construction of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, which was
"first authorized in 1942 in the interest of national defense." " In his
view, however, the most important and effective function of public
environmental litigation lies in seeking "preventive" injunctions against
proposed actions. Indeed, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) 17 already requires agencies to make a detailed study of,
and statement on, proposed actions having environmental impact, in-
cluding the study of alternative courses which might achieve the ob-
jectives of the Act. The NEPA has been the basis for several in-
junctions against proposed projects and new work on continuing
projects.'
8
To enable courts to reach the merits of environmental disputes and
recognize that citizens have enforceable rights against both private and
public entities, Professor Sax calls for revitalization and expansion of
the public trust doctrine. Referring to the origins of that doctrine in
Roman law, he notes that "[i]t was founded upon the vdry sensible
idea that certain common properties, such as rivers, the seashore, and
the air, were held by government in trusteeship for the free and un-
impeded use of the general public." 19
After briefly reviewing the manner in which the doctrine has been
applied by American courts only to certain types of properties such as
"shorelands and parks," 20 and referring to the maxim applicable to
private property, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-use your own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another," 21 he calls
for application of the same principle, through the use of the doctrine
of public trust, to all of the aspects of the environment in which the
15 Civil No. 2655-69 (D.D.C., 2d amended complaint filed Apr. 9, 1970).
-16J. SAx, supra note 6, at 210. Plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction on
January 15, 1971, 2 [Cases] BNA ENv. REP. 1173, and a few days later President
NLxon ordered work on the project halted.
Generally, however, Professor Sax suggests that seeking preliminary injunctions
against ongoing projects and programs-attempting to upset the status quo-is hardly
worthwhile because "such cases are amenable to problems of delay, protracted appeals,
and debilitating legal warfare." J. SAx, supra note 6, at 120. Undoubtedly, he is
right, but for the very reasons he so eloquently expresses, of all available remedies,
the lawsuit may still be the best choice. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (controversy over the continued
registration of pesticides containing DDT).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
18 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, Civil No.
LR-70-C-203 (D. Ark. Feb. 19, 1971) (Gillham Dam on the Cossatot River);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 2 [Cases] BNA ENV. REP.
1173 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1971) (Cross-Florida Barge Canal); Wilderness Society v.
Hickel, 1 [Cases] BNA ENv. Ria'. 1335 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1970).
19 J. SAx, supra note 6, at 163-64.
20 Id. 164.
21Id. 158-59.
1086 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
public has an important interest. That trust would be enforceable
directly by citizens as owners of the public interest involved, not just
by a bureaucrat acting as middleman. This would not mean that such
resources would never be legitimately subjected to other, incompatible
public uses, or even to certain types of private use. But in the event
of such proposed reallocation, courts would be ready to scrutinize the
proposal as non-insiders, and to enforce the public trust in those re-
sources in the manner appropriate for the particular case. This would
require an offsetting public benefit to justify the proposed new use,
either in the proposed new activity itself or through other arrange-
ments. On occasion, a review and decision by the legislature of the
propriety of the new use would be necessary before the courts would
permit it.
To implement the public trust doctrine, the author calls for the use
of the "legislative remand" and the "judicial moratorium" and provides
illustrative cases in which they have been effective.' If either conflict-
ing legislative policies respecting the use of a particular resource, or
conflicts between an apparent legislative policy and the public interest in
a resource arise, an injunction might be appropriate to maintain the
status quo pending legislative review of the controversy. Similarly,
a policy decision by the legislature may appear to call for a particular
public use of certain resources, and a public agency's proposed decision
regarding that resource may preclude that use. An injunction pre-
venting implementation of that agency decision will act as a "mora-
torium" on further action, and provide an opportunity for reflective
agency action geared to implementing the declared legislative policy.
One argument made persuasively at several points in the book is
that the innovative public litigation and exhaustive judicial review that
Professor Sax suggests would compel better environmental planning.
Further, the case examples given and the underlying strategy espoused
by Professor Sax make clear that such litigation is not designed to
invite the courts to substitute their will or their view of appropriate
public policy for that of the legislature.2 3 To the contrary, by preserving
2 2 1d. 175-92, 193-211.
23Chief Justice Burger has expressed concern about this point. See note 8 supra.
While Professor Sax would like to see the courts take an active role in enforcing
the public trust in environmental resources, he doubts the wisdom of proposals calling
for the recognition of a constitutional right to a decent or healthful environment
because, inter alia, the courts rather than the legislatures would become the ultimate
authority for declaring such rights; they could not be overruled by the legislature.
J. SAX, supra note 6, at 237; cf. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment:
Progress Along a Constitutional Avenue, in LAw ANID THE ENVOITMENT 134 (M.
Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970). Since a decent environment, however, is a basic
necessity for human happiness-indeed, meaningful survival-it would appear that
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to it, in the flexible and reasonable
manner that Professor Sax would have the courts apply the public trust doctrine,
need not give rise to the constitutional crises that Professor Sax fears. One federal
judge has stated in an air pollution case:
[There is] no difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and prop-
erty are constitutionally protected . . . and surely a person's health is what,
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the status quo where the legislative intent is ambiguous, by bringing
public and legislative attention to the controversy, and by compelling
(in the instance of the remand) clarifying legislative action, such liti-
gation serves to focus attention on the underlying policy considerations
involved, keeps public agencies from violating legislative directives, may
enhance the deliberative aspects and quality of the legislative process,
and may lead to new ways of preserving the quality of our environment.
in a most significant degree, sustains life. So it seems to me that each of us
is constitutionally protected in our natural and personal state of life and
health.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 1 [Cases] BNA ENv.
REP. 1640 (D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1970).
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